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Abstract
This article discusses and analyses one of the most popular commercial contracts
in China: the private lending agreement. It refers to moneylending arrangements
between a business borrower and its debt investors. Millions of private businesses
in China, having limited access to the state-dominated banking sector, rely on
private financing to borrow funds. The market volume of the private lending sector
amounts to CNY 4 trillion (US$580.6 billion). In 2014, there were 1.02 million
private lending-related civil cases heard by Chinese courts.
Introduction
Private lending (or private financing) agreements have been one of themost popular
commercial contracts in China.1This refers to moneylending arrangements between
a business borrower and its debt investors. Major state banks in China, including
the Big Four, prefer to make loans to other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
local government financing vehicles rather than private businesses.2 As a result,
Chinese entrepreneurs in need of funds have to seek financing channels outside
the banking sector, and most of them borrow money from their family members,
business partners, professional moneylenders, underground money houses, and
other private investors. The strong financing demands have contributed to the
formation and prosperity of a massive private lending market in China, which is
considered as a vital element of the Chinese shadow banking system. According
to one estimation, the underground lending sector was worth CNY 4 trillion
(US$580.6 billion).3
*Dr Lerong Lu, Teaching Fellow in Financial Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London;
PhD and LLM (University of Leeds); LLB (ECUPL); Attorney-at-Law, PRC. Email at: lerong.lu@kcl.ac.uk1 In Chinese, private lending agreements are called “Min Jian Jie Dai He Tong”. For the convenience of international
readers, the Chinese currency (CNY) in this article is accompanied by a conversion into US dollars. The exchange
rate between CNY and USD was 6.89:1 on 22 March 2017.2The Big Four in China’s banking sector refers to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China.3Dong Tao and Weishen Deng, “China: Shadow Banking - Road to Heightened Risks”, Credit Suisse Economic
Research (22 February 2013), p.2.
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In contrast to the wide popularity of private loans, relevant laws and regulations
governing private financing transactions have remained underexplored. Therefore,
this article aims to fill this gap in the literature, and provides a detailed analysis
of Chinese laws relating to private lending agreements. It gives useful guidance
for legal practitioners dealing with Chinese businesses, and for researchers who
have an interest in Chinese commercial law.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section explains in detail why private
lending contracts have gained great popularity in China’s commercial world, while
the second section examines the private lending crisis in 2011, which is often
dubbed “China’s subprime crisis”. After introducing the background knowledge
of private lending market, the remainder of this article focuses on the doctrinal
analysis of legal rules regarding private lending contracts. The third section
evaluates provisions under the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Contract Law
1999, regarding rights and obligations of contracting parties of a private lending
agreement.4 Next, the fourth section continues to study the latest judicial
interpretation made by the China’s Supreme Court in 2015 about private lending
agreements, while the fifth section pays attention to the official interest rate cap.
The sixth section considers some illegal lending and borrowing practices that could
constitute a criminal offence under the Chinese criminal code. After that, the
seventh section points out further compliance issues that merit attention from
lending parties and their legal advisers. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.
Why is private financing so popular in China?
Over the past four decades, owing to China’s market-oriented economic reform,
millions of entrepreneurs have established their own businesses in pursuit of
personal wealth and a better quality of life. This led to the rapid growth of the
Chinese economy. In 2010, China replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest
economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), just after the US.5 In 2016,
China’s economy grew by 6.7 per cent, a key driver of the global economic growth.6
There is no denying that the real driving force behind China’s economic rise is the
proliferation of private capitalism and entrepreneurship, as newly established
privately owned businesses have been gradually replacing low-efficient and
bureaucratic SOEs that have dominated the economy for several decades under
the state planned economy. As of June 2016, China had a total number of 80.78
million registered enterprises, 90 per cent of which were privately owned.7 The
private sector has contributed to 65 per cent of China’s GDP as well as 80 per cent
of employment, but, in sharp contrast, private businesses only received 20 per cent
of total bank credits.8
Therefore, a large number of private businesses have been facing financial
difficulties for a long time. This is because the state has exerted strict controls over
4PRC Contract Law 1999 was passed by the second session of the ninth National People’s Congress on 15 March
1999, came into effect on 1 October 1999.5Mure Dickie and Jonathan Soble, “China Displaces Japan as Second Biggest Economy”, Financial Times, 15
February 2011, p.9.6 “China’s economy grows 6.7% in 2016” (20 January 2017), BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business
-38686568 [Accessed 1 March 2018].7“Private Businesses Exceed 90%” (25 July 2016),China Business Time, http://epaper.cbt.com.cn/epaper/uniflows
/html/2016/07/25/01/01_87.htm [Accessed 1 March 2018].8Emma Dong and Simon Rabinovitch, “China’s Lending Laboratory”, Financial Times, 23 May 2012, p.11.
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China’s banking sector through majority ownership. For instance, the Central
Huijin Investment Ltd, the investment arm of China’s Central Government, owns
over 60 per cent of stakes in each of the Big Four banks in China.9 As a result, the
state lenders, influenced heavily by the Government’s credit policy, tend to allocate
most of their loan quotas to SOEs. Thus, it remains difficult for private businesses
to borrow sufficient credit from the banking sector, which forces them to look for
alternative form of finance. The private lending market seems a perfect choice for
entrepreneurs to raise funds, as in practice many of them raise money from their
relatives, business partners, undergroundmoney houses, or other informal financial
institutions. The contracts they sign to borrow money are the private lending
agreements we discuss here.
On the other hand, savers and investors have been searching for good investment
opportunities that can increase the return on their money. The Chinese people are
famous for being avid savers, so the country has the highest gross saving rate in
the world (49 per cent), according to the World Bank.10 However, the real interest
rate for bank savings has often remained negative owing to the high inflation rate,
which means that Chinese savers are gradually losing money on every yuan in
their bank accounts. Consequently, a large number of ordinary households and
business owners who have spare savings or capital are looking for good investments
that can bring satisfactory returns. For instance, in 2015, the stock market in China
saw a huge speculative bubble, as the Shanghai Composite Indexmore than doubled
in one year.11 Driven by the desire to make money quickly, people rushed to
purchase shares in public companies and some even borrowed heavily from
securities brokers and shadow banks to fund the investment, despite the
deteriorating economic situation after the global financial crisis. Besides, the
housing price in major Chinese cities, fuelled by the money from rich individuals,
has been soaring in the past decade. In 2015 alone, the average housing price in
Shanghai increased by 20 per cent, even though the Government has set strict rules
to curb property speculation.12 Apparently, the recent equity and property
speculation demonstrates the desire of Chinese investors to find good investments.
Similarly, they also compete to lend their money out to money-starved private
businesses, in order to earn eye-catching interests. Even some SOEs having
abundant cash reserves try to take part in the moneylending business by extending
loans to other businesses in need of funds.13
Clearly, the money supply from individual and corporate investors, coupled
with the strong financing demand from private businesses, has contributed to a
thriving private lending market in China. According to a survey by the People’s
Bank of China, 89 per cent of households and 59 per cent of businesses inWenzhou,
a Chinese city well known for its entrepreneurship, have been actively participating
in private lending activities.14 In the recent decade, private financing has evolved
9Lerong Lu, “Private Banks in China: Origin, Challenges and Regulatory Implications” (2016) 31 Banking and
Finance Law Review 585, 586.10World Bank, “Gross savings (% of GDP)”, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNS.ICTR.ZS?order=wbapi
_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc [Accessed 1 March 2018].11Lerong Lu and Longjie Lu, “Unveiling China’s Stock Market Bubble: Margin Financing, the Leveraged Bull
and Governmental Responses” (2017) 32 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 146, 146.12 “Chinese Property: For Whom the Bubble Blows”, The Economist, 12 March 2016, p.73.13 Shen Wei, “Shadow Banking System in China - Origin, Uniqueness and Governmental Response” (2013) 28
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 20, 21.14 People’s Bank of China, “Wenzhou Private Lending Market Report” (21 July 2011).
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into a massive financing sector. As stated, the market scale was around CNY 4
trillion (US$580.6 billion) in 2012. More recently, the Southwest University of
Finance and Economics predicted that the size of informal financing industry can
be as much as CNY 5 trillion (US$725.7 billion) in 2014.15 However, obtaining a
private loan can be extremely costly for business borrowers, for the annualised
interest rate is normally from 14 to 70 per cent.16 It is evident that the high
borrowing cost creates a heavy debt burden for lots of Chinese businesses, in
particular when the economic growth has been slowing down after the financial
crisis.
China’s subprime crisis and rising private lending disputes
Since 2011, China has witnessed a series of credit crisis in its private lending
market, as a large number of business borrowers failed to repay private debts owing
to their worsening financial conditions in the economic downturn. According to
a survey in 2011, more than 65 per cent of entrepreneurs in Wenzhou, who had
businesses with annual revenue of over CNY30million (US$4.35million), believed
that a financial crisis would be inevitable.17 Soon afterwards, Wenzhou was the
first Chinese city to face a severe credit crunch, as 20 per cent of the city’s 360,000
SMEs ceased operation owing to a cash shortage.18 More than 80 business owners
in Wenzhou were reported to have escaped the city to evade debts as they were
unable to pay off the money owed to private lenders, and some entrepreneurs even
committed suicide under the pressure from debt collectors.19 In the first eight
months of 2011, the combined amount of money in private lending civil disputes
received by the city’s court system surged by 71 per cent to CNY 5 billion
(US$728.9 million), as corporate bankruptcy spread the city.20
In one year, the private lending crisis swept across China, often referred to as
“China’s subprime crisis” by the media.21 For example, in Fujian Province where
the private sector dominates the economy, there have been numerous companies
falling into bankruptcy, while many entrepreneurs abandoned their companies and
fled their home towns to hide from debt collection. In July 2014, Mr Ding Hui,
the chairman and CEO of Fujian Nuoqi Company Ltd, a fashion cloth retailer
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, suddenly went missing, as he could not
repay multi-billion-yuan private debts owed to moneylenders.22 Accordingly, the
share price of Nuoqi Company slumped and lost almost 50 per cent of its value in
15 “Long-term Underground Private Lending Endanger Financial Ecology” (22 September 2014), Xinhua, http:/
/jjckb.xinhuanet.com/2014-09/22/content_521666.htm [Accessed 1 March 2018].16 “Fears Surface Over Chinese Debt Amid Lending Practices” (6 October 2011), BBC News, http://www.bbc.co
.uk/news/business-15194663http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15194663 [Accessed 1 March 2018].17Ran Yu and Hongyi Wang, “Wenzhou Credit Crisis ‘Inevitable’ with Unchecked Private Lending” (14 October
2011), China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-10/14/content_13896213.htm [Accessed 1 March
2018].18 “Fears Surface over Chinese Debt amid Lending Practices” (6 October 2011), BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/business-15194663 [Accessed 1 March 2018].19 “Fears Surface over Chinese Debt amid Lending Practices” (6 October 2011), BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/business-15194663 [Accessed 1 March 2018].20Most of these claims are the request to fulfil the contract law obligation. See “China May Inject Cash to Prevent
Wenzhou Crisis, ING Says” (30 September 2011), Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-30
/china-may-inject-cash-to-prevent-wenzhou-crisis-ing-says [Accessed 1 March 2018].21Austin Ramzy, “ACredit Crisis in China’sMost Enterprising City IsMaking the Country Nervous” (28 November
2011), Time, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2099675,00.html [Accessed 1 March 2018].22Lerong Lu, “’Runaway Bosses’ in China: Private Lending, Credit Crunches and the Regulatory Response” (2015)
18 Financial Regulation International 1, 1-3.
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three trading days. Moreover, Fujian has seen the collapse of several large-scale
informal private lending networks, which includes Ms Zhong Mingzhen’s giant
financing guarantee business that has attracted CNY 3.7 billion (US$537 million)
from private investors.23
Apparently, the widespread financial crisis had a catastrophic impact on relevant
stakeholders and the financial stability. In particular, as business borrowers could
not fulfil their debt obligations, moneylenders and investors suffered great financial
losses. Since the private lendingmarket has been operating outside China’s financial
regulatory system, private debt investments do not receive any kind of official
protection. Therefore, the only legitimate way for debt investors to claim back
their money is to file a civil lawsuit against borrowers. Such legal claims are based
on the creditor-debtor contractual relationship. Thus, following the crisis, massive
private lending-related civil cases overwhelmed China’s court system. According
to Mr Du Wanhua, a senior judge at the Supreme Court, there were 1.02 million
private lending cases in 2014 heard by all Chinese courts, making private financing
the second-largest category of civil litigation in the country, just next to marriage
and family cases.24
Loan agreements under PRC contract law
A loan contract is a moneylending agreement between a borrower and one or more
moneylenders, which documents mutual promises regarding moneylending issues.
In China, despite the large amount of money involved in private lending, any
moneylending activities essentially constitute a contractual relationship between
a creditor and a debtor. Therefore, lending parties have to comply with provisions
under the PRC Contract Law 1999. A valid private lending agreement, like any
other contract, comprises basic elements including offer, acceptance and
consideration (interest). Nonetheless, the common issues regulated by the general
principles of contract law are not discussed here, while the attention is focused on
specific provisions governing loan agreements.
The codified PRC Contract Law has 428 articles under 23 chapters. Chapters 1
to 8 contain general provisions in terms of the legislative purpose, and basic
principles and rules that shall be observed in any contracts concluded in China.25
After that, Chs 9 to 23 set out detailed rules for 15 specific types of contracts that
are frequently used in commercial practices, such as sales contracts, moneylending
contracts, lease contracts, brokerage contracts, and so on. In particular, Ch.12 of
the PRCContract Law is entitled “loan contract”, as it lays down basic requirements
for formalities and contents of a lending agreement, legal rights and obligations
of lending parties, and situations that lead to a breach and relevant remedies. It
should be noted that such rules were primarily designed for contracts relating to
bank loans, but they also apply to all moneylending agreements in China including
23 “The Run on Rongdian” (8 July 2011),Week in China, https://www.weekinchina.com/2011/07/the-run-on
-rongdian/ [Accessed 1 March 2018].24 “Private Lending Disputes Became China’s Second Largest Civil Litigation Type: The Supreme Court Issued
New Judicial Interpretation” (6 August 2015), Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-08/06/c_1116171913
.htm [Accessed 1 March 2018].25 For instance, Ch.2 concerns the conclusion (formation) of a contract; Ch.3 lays down the rules for the validity
of a contract; Ch.4 concerns the fulfilment of a contract; Ch.5 concerns the modification and transferring of a contract;
Ch.6 concerns the termination of rights and obligations under a contract; Chapter 7 lays down liabilities for the breach
of contract; and Ch.8 contains some miscellaneous provisions.
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private lending and online peer-to-peer lending. The following scrutinises the
relevant provisions under Ch.12:
• Definition of loan contract:
A “loan contract” means the agreement whereby a borrower borrows
funds from a lender, and repays the loan with interests when it falls
due.26
• Form requirement and main clauses:
A loan contract shall be made in written form, except for lending
agreements between natural persons. A loan contract shall contain
essential clauses including the loan’s type, currency, purpose of use,
amount of money, interest rate, term time, andmethod of repayment.27
• Contract guarantee:
When entering into a loan contract, the lender may require the
borrower to provide a guarantee. Creating a guarantee shall be
compliant with rules under the PRC Guaranty Law 1995.28
Apparently, requesting any forms of guarantees can secure the
performance of a private loan for the benefit of the lender, which is
able to compensate some potential risks of defaults. There are three
forms of guarantees under Chinese laws: surety (guarantee), mortgage
and pledge.29
• Borrower’s obligation to disclose financial information:
When making a loan contract, the borrower, as requested by the
lender, shall provide truthful information regarding its business
activities and financial conditions relevant to money lending.30
• Prohibition of deducting interest in advance:
The interest of a loan shall not be deducted from the principal prior
to lending. If the interest is deducted in advance, the loan shall be
repaid according to the actual amount of money received by the
borrower, so shall the interest rate be calculated.31 In practice, many
moneylenders try to deduct interests from the principal, before they
transfer the money to borrowers. Two reasons can be given for this.
First, certain moneylenders charge interest which exceeds the official
ceiling set by the state. In order to get around the restriction, they
choose to deduct the excessive part of the interest from the principal
in advance. Secondly, some moneylenders do this to reduce the risk
of lending by realising interest incomes at first. Clearly, this unfair
lending practice prejudices the interest of borrowers who in most
26 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.196.27 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.197.28 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.198.29 In Chinese surety (guarantee) is “Dan Bao”, mortgage is “Di Ya”, and pledge is “Zhi Ya”.30 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.199.31 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.200.
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cases are in a vulnerable position and have no choice but accept all
conditions.
• Liability for breach of contract:
If the lender fails to offer the right amount of loan at the agreed time,
which leads to the borrower’s losses, it shall be liable to compensate
such losses. If the borrower owing to its own fault fails to collect the
loan at the agreed time, it still has the obligation to pay interest.32
• Lender’s right to inspect loan performance:
The lender is entitled to inspect and supervise how the borrower uses
the loan. The borrower shall provide financial statements to the lender
at regular intervals as stated in the contract.33
• Remedy for violating the use of loan:
Where the borrower does not use the loan for the prescribed purpose,
the lender can stop issuing the loan, recall the loan or terminate the
contract.34
• Interest payment:
The borrower shall pay the interests at the prescribed time according
to the contract.35 Where the time of interest payment is not agreed
or the agreement is unclear, or cannot be determined in accordance
with art.61 of this Law (which is about the remedy for unclear
contract clauses), if the loan term is less than one year, the interest
shall be paid together with the principal at the end of the contract;
if the loan term is one year or longer, the interest shall be paid at the
end of each annual period, and where the remaining period is less
than one year, the interest shall be paid together with the principal
at the end of the contract.
• Principal repayment:
The borrower shall repay the principal at the prescribed time.36Where
the time of repayment is not agreed or the agreement is unclear, nor
can it be determined in accordance with art.61 of this Law, the
borrower can repay the loan at any time; and the lender can demand
the loan repayment at any time, provided a reasonable notice period
is given to the borrower.
• Overdue interest:
Where the borrower fails to repay the loan at the prescribed time, it
shall pay overdue interest in accordance with the contract or relevant
32 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.201.33 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.202.34 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.203.35 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.205.36 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.206.
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regulations of the state.37 Failing to pay the loan constitutes a breach
of contract, so the Law enables the lenders to charge overdue interest
as financial compensations.
• Early repayment:
Where the borrower prepays the loan early, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, the interests shall be calculated based on the actual
period of borrowing.38 A debtor is allowed to pay off debts earlier
than the original term, and the Law protects the debtor’s rights by
asking it to pay interests based on the real time of borrowing.
• Loan extension:
The borrower can ask the lender for an extension of the loan term
before its maturity date.39 Upon the lender’s consent the loan term
may be extended.
• Time of taking effect for loans between natural persons:
A loan contract between natural persons becomes effective at the
time when the lender makes the loan amount available.40 It means
that the action of drafting and signing the loan contract does not
guarantee its effectiveness, unless the lender provides the money for
the borrower. However, if the lending contract involves a legal person
as one of its contracting parties, the loan agreement will take effect
when it is signed.
• Interest rate for loans between natural persons:
Where a loan contract between natural persons does not stipulate the
payment of interest or the stipulation is unclear, the loan shall be
deemed interest-free; if a loan contract between natural persons
stipulates the payment of interest, the interest rate shall not contravene
relevant regulations of the state (which will be discussed later).41
This provision has reflected the legislative purpose in the 1990s that
private lending agreements are mainly conducted between relatives,
friends and acquaintances in our daily lives, for non-profit purpose,
so if there is no clear term about interest, it is better to have no
interest to protect the interest of borrowers. However, private lending
nowadays has been widely used as a method for business financing.
As this rule applies, the individual moneylender or investor will not
be able to collect any interest from an individual borrower if the
agreement is not clear enough, which seems unfair for the lender.
37 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.207.38 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.208.39 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.209.40PRC Contract Law 1999 art.210. According to civil law principles, a consensual contract (Nuo Cheng He Tong)
is a contract that is founded upon the mere agreement between two contracting parties, without any external formality
or action to fulfil the obligation. However, a real contract (Shi Jian He Tong) refers to those in which it is necessary
to have something more than mere consent to conclude a contract, such as certain actions like providing the money.41 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.211.
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Latest judicial interpretation for private lending contracts
Apart from the PRCContract Law, there are several pieces of judicial interpretations
made by the Supreme Court regarding private lending contracts, which enjoy the
status of laws and are binding on all court decisions in China. Clearly, these judicial
interpretations provide additional rules for parties of a private lending agreement
to follow. In August 2015, the Supreme Court published the latest interpretation
entitled “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trials of Private Lending Cases”, which
is widely known as “Provision 18”.42 It was issued on 6 August 2015, and took
effect from 1 September 2015. According to Provision 18, private lending refers
to moneylending activities among natural persons, legal persons and other
organisations; however, it does not apply to lending disputes involving financial
institutions and their branches.43
The PRC Contract Law has already set out general situations that result in the
invalidity of a contract, such as one party using fraudulent or coercive methods to
conclude the contract, or the contract involving a malicious conspiracy that will
cause damages to interests of the nation, a collective or a third party.44 In addition,
Provision 18 stipulates the following circumstances where a court will consider a
private lending contract as invalid:
• when the lender borrows a loan from financial institutions at first,
and then re-lends the money to the borrower at a higher rate (the
borrower knows or should have known in advance);
• when the lender borrows a loan from other enterprises or raise funds
from its own employees, and then re-lends the money to the borrower
for the purpose of making profits (the borrower knows or should
have known in advance);
• when the lender knows or should have known in advance that the
borrower takes the loan for criminal activities, but still provides the
loan;
• when the contract violates the public order or good morals; or
• when the contract violates laws, administrative regulations, and other
mandatory rules.45
In the past, the validity of a private lending contract largely depended on the identity
of the lending parties. For a long time, the Chinese authority only admitted the
legitimacy of moneylending agreements between two individuals (natural persons),
and it remained very sceptical about loan contracts involving a non-financial
enterprise. This is because the primary concern of the authority was to combat
illegal financial practice: in particular, some enterprises that make loans and take
deposits without a banking licence. Therefore, in judicial practice, a private
financing contract between two non-financial enterprises would be deemed null
42 Provision 18 was passed by the 1655th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court in
2015.43 Supreme People’s Court, “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning The
Application of Law in the Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18) art.1.44 PRC Contract Law 1999 art.52.45 Supreme People’s Court, “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning The
Application of Law in the Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18) art.14.
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and void by a Chinese court, which would ask the borrower to return the principal
to the lender.
However, the latest judicial interpretation has seen a big shift in the official
attitude towards private lending between two non-financial enterprises. Provision
18 states that,
“a private lending agreement entered by legal persons and other organisations,
for the purpose of production and business operation, will be held valid by a
court, provided that it does not have circumstances under the Article 52 of
PRC Contract Law and the Article 14 of this regulation”.46
Clearly, it legalises the private financing activities between two companies or other
business organisations, without the need to have a bank as the intermediary. It
allows Chinese businesses in need of funds to borrow money directly from other
corporate and individual investors, which can to some extent alleviate the financing
difficulty faced by entrepreneurs.
Interest rate ceiling
From 1991 to2015, China implemented a strict set of interest rate regulations for
private lending contracts, which was referred to as the “four-time red line”. Any
lending practices crossing this line might be declared as usury, and, as a result,
lenders could be subject to heavy administrative or criminal sanctions. The
four-time red line means that the interest rate of private lending should not exceed
four times the interest rate of a bank loan of the same kind.47 For example, if the
interest rate of a one-year bank loan is 5 per cent (which depends on the benchmark
rate set by the People’s Bank of China), the corresponding interest rate cap for a
one-year private loan will be 20 per cent.
In 2015, the four-time red line was officially abolished and replaced by new
regulations under Provision 18:
• if the annualised interest rate of a private loan does not exceed 24
per cent, it will be held valid by a court48;
• if the annualised interest rate exceeds 36 per cent, the excessive part
of the interest will be deemed invalid by a court, and will be returned
to the borrower upon request49; and
• if the annualised interest rate is more than 24 per cent but less than
36 per cent, a court will make judgments depending on the specific
circumstance.50 Where the borrower has already paid the interests to
the lender, the court will not compel the lender to return the excessive
part of the interest. Nor will the court support the lender’s claim for
46 Supreme People’s Court, “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18), art.11.47Supreme People’s Court, “SomeOpinions Concerning the Hearing of Private Lending Cases by People’s Courts”
(1991, FAMINFA No.21) art.6.48 Supreme People’s Court, “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18) art.26.49 “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the
Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18) art.26.50 “The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the
Trials of Private Lending Cases” (2015, FASHI No.18) art.31.
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the borrower to pay interests over 24 per cent when the interest is
unpaid.
The new rule adopts a three-level approach. Any claims of interest under 24 per
cent will be fully supported by a court, while any claims over 36 per cent will be
declared null and void. The tricky part is the interest between 24 per cent and 36
per cent, which will be treated as naturalis obligatio by a court, namely a legal
obligation which is unenforceable. Compared with the old four-time red line, the
new regulation gives more autonomy to lending parties regarding the interest rate,
which indicates the less interventionist approach of the authority.
When lending parties set their interest rate in a private financing agreement,
they can refer to the Wenzhou Private Financing Index, which is official guidance
concerning the interest rate level of private financing activities in China.51 The
Wenzhou Index has been compiled by Wenzhou City’s Financial Affairs Office,
and it is constructed with rigorous statistical methods to reflect the level, tendency
and fluctuation of the price of private financing. It has become an important
indicator for market participants, financial regulators as well as judicial authorities,
which improves the transparency of transactions and increases the efficiency of
the allocation of financial resources.
Currently, the Index has a local version for investors in Wenzhou City as well
as a national version for the whole country. The local version, entitled the
“Wenzhou Private Financing Comprehensive Index”, was officially released on
7 December 2012, and the Index has been updated on a daily basis since 1 January
2013.52 The national version of Wenzhou Index, entitled the “China Private
Financing Comprehensive Index”, has been compiled and circulated to the public
since 26 September 2013, the data of which come from monitoring points in more
than 40 Chinese cities.53 Unlike the local version, it is published on a weekly basis.
The Wenzhou Index is further divided into several sub-indexes based on different
financing entities and time periods. As for different financing entities, they are
divided into six categories: the rural rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs) index; the private lending service centre index; the private capital
management company index; the small-credit company index; direct private lending
index; and other entities index. In terms of financing periods, the Wenzhou Index
is presented in six categories including 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 12 months,
and over 12 months.
51Wenzhou Private Financing Index Official Website, “About Wenzhou Index”, http://wzpfi.gov.cn/About.aspx
[Accessed 2 March 2018].52 “China’s Wenzhou Launches Private Lending Index” (7 December 2012), Reuters, http://www.reuters.com
/article/2012/12/08/china-wenzhou-shadowbanking-idUSL4N09I0G920121208, [Accessed 2 March 2018].53Wenzhou Financial Affairs Office and Thomson Reuters Jointly LaunchedWenzhou Index Globally” (10 January
2014), Caijing Finance, http://finance.caijing.com.cn/20140110/3190929.shtml, [Accessed 14 March 2018].
226 Journal of Business Law
[2018] J.B.L., Issue 3 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
15.64Table 1: Wenzhou Index (23 March 2017)54
Wenzhou Private Lending Comprehensive Interest Index
(Annualised interest rate in percentage)
R u r a l
ROSCAs
Other enti-
ties
Direct lend-
ing
Private capi-
tal manage-
Small-credit
companies
Private lend-
ing service
centres
Divided by en-
tity
ment compa-
nies
12.2623.8013.9516.6316.0614.78
More than 1 year1 year6 months3 months1 monthDivided by
time 12.5012.5914.9818.2020.09
Illegal moneylending offences
Lending parties and their legal advisers should be wary of certain illegal lending
and borrowing practices resulting in criminal offences under the PRC Criminal
Law 1997. For example, the offence of “illegal absorbing public deposits” punishes
anyone (an individual or the person in charge of an organisation) who, without a
financial licence, illegally takes deposits from the general public or do so in a
disguised form, leading to the disruption of financial stability.55 The offender is
subject to criminal detention or imprisonment up to three years, or/and a fine (CNY
20,000-200,000; US$2,900-29,000). Where the amount of deposits is relatively
large or other serious circumstances exist, the offender could face sentence up to
10 years, plus a fine (CNY 50,000-500,000; US$7,257-72,570).
The purpose of these penalties is to penalise individuals and corporates who
conduct deposit-taking businesses without a financial licence from the China
Banking Regulation Commission, the banking watchdog. The major distinction
between private financing and illegal deposit-taking depends on whether the
borrower approaches potential investors in a public way or not. If the borrower
solicits funds from a large number of unspecific people, such as making
advertisements in newspapers, billboards, websites, text messages, and social
networking, this will constitute the offence. Therefore, businesses in China that
would like to borrow funds from private investors should avoid advertising in
public, as private lending has to be done in a “private” way.
Moreover, borrowers have to be cautious about the offence of “fraudulent
fundraising”, as over the past few years many Chinese entrepreneurs have been
put behind bars owing to this offence.56 Whoever, for the purpose of illegal
possession, raises funds by fraudulent methods, if the amount involved is relatively
large, will face criminal detention or a fixed-term sentence up to five years, plus
a fine (CNY 20,000-200,000; US$2,900-29,000); if the amount involved is
enormous or other serious circumstances exist, it will face sentence up to 10 years,
plus a fine (CNY 50,000-500,000; US$7,257-72,570); if the amount involved is
particularly great or other particularly serious circumstances exist, it will face
54Data Source: Wenzhou Private Financing Index Official Website, http://www.wzpfi.gov.cn [Accessed 2 March
2018].55 PRC Criminal Law 1997 art.176.56 PRC Criminal Law 1997 art.192.
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sentence up to life imprisonment, plus a fine (CNY 50,000-500,000;
US$7,257-72,570).
In practice, if the borrower has a real intention to borrow money to finance its
business venture, the relevant lending agreement will not constitute a criminal
offence, even if the borrower defaults in the future. Conversely, if the borrower
intends to illegally possess the money when it borrows the funds, this will be
considered as a fraud. However, it remains a challenging task for Chinese judges
to ascertain the borrower’s real intention when borrowing money, so in many cases
they just presume that borrowers owing large sums of money to several investors
are fraudsters, if they fail to repay loans on time. Clearly, the offence of “fraudulent
fundraising” has raised a lot of controversy owing to its vagueness. For instance,
in R v Wu Ying (2009) ZJJH, Ms Wu Ying was a young multi-millionaire in
Zhejiang Province, who was sentenced to death because of defrauding CNY 770
million (US$111.8 million) from 11 people, with unreasonably high interest rates
being promised.57 This case triggered a public debate in China, as many people
including legal experts did not consider Wu as a criminal, since what she did is
no more than informal financing, or private lending without banks.58 Finally, the
Supreme Court ordered a re-trial for this case, and Wu’s life was saved.
Further compliance issues
Some regional governments require private loans meeting certain standards to be
registered with local financial authorities. Therefore, lending parties and their legal
consultants have to check with local financial authorities about detailed compliance
requirements. For example, inWenzhou, there is a piece of local financial regulation
entitled “Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation 2014”.59 It has imposed an
obligation on borrowers to submit a copy of the contract to the local financial
management department or other commissioned lending service centres within 15
days of signing the agreement. Any of the following situations have to be reported:
• a single private loan worth more than CNY 3million (US$435,400);
• the borrower’s total loan balance of private lending exceeds CNY
10 million (US$1.45 million);
• the borrower borrows money from more than 30 individuals and/or
enterprises.60
For the rest of private lending transactions, lenders and borrowers are encouraged
to file their loans with the authority on a voluntary basis.61 Although the duty of
reporting rests on the borrower, the lender has the responsibility to supervise the
borrower in doing this and is entitled to register loans if the borrower fails to do
so.62 If there are anymajor changes to the lending agreement concerning the lending
amount, the loan period, or the interest rate, the borrower must report the relevant
57The first instance of R v Wu Ying (2009) was heard by Zhejiang Province Jinhua City Intermediate Court. The
appeal case, or second instance, was heard by Zhejiang Province High Court.58Martin Yip, “Death for Fraud: China Debates Wu Ying’s Sentence” (24 February 2012), BBC News, http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17071311 [Accessed 2 March 2018].59Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation (2014) was passed at the 6th meeting of the standing committee of the
12th Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress on 22 November 2013, and came into effect on 1 March 2014.60Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation (2014) art.14(1).61Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation (2014) art.14(4).62Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation (2014) art.14(3).
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changes to the regulator within 15 days.63 Besides, the private lending regulator in
Wenzhou has established an online recording system to make it convenient for
debtors and creditors to register lending contracts. Borrowers need to register an
online account, complete the application form and upload relevant documents.
After that, the lending transaction will be verified and recorded by lending service
centres. Clearly, the online reporting system is favourable to lots of businessmen
and women, as nowadays more than 50 per cent of private loans related to project
financing have been recorded via the online system.64
Failing to comply with the reporting requirement will lead to administrative
penalties. If the borrower in a private lending agreement does not fulfil the reporting
obligation or provides false material, the local financial authority will order the
borrower to correct the wrongdoing within a specified time-limit. If the borrower
does not make any correction within that period, the private lending activity will
be publicised, and the borrower, if it is a natural person, will be fined CNY
10,000-50,000 (US$1,450-7,250) for an individual, or CNY 30,000-100,000
(US$4,350-14,500) if the borrower is a enterprise or other organisation.65
Conclusion
Over the past few years, the Chinese authority has gradually admitted the legitimacy
of private lending as a financing method for Chinese businesses. Therefore,
businesses in need of funds can utilise private lending agreements to borrow funds
from private investors.When doing this, corporate managers and legal consultants
have to ensure that their lending agreements are compliant with provisions under
the PRC Contract Law as well as rules contained in Provision 18, in particular the
latest “24/36” interest rate cap. Moreover, lending parties should try to avoid illegal
lending practices such as advertising the financing need to the public and using
funds for other purposes not stated in the contract. Currently, there are over 1
million private lending-related civil cases received by Chinese courts each year,
which could be a potential source of business opportunities for commercial lawyers.
Clearly, this massive shadow banking sector merits more attention from legal
practitioners and scholars.
63Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation Implementation Rules (2014) art.13.64 “Outstanding Results for Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation” (5 March 2015),Wenzhou Business Online,
http://finance.66wz.com/system/2015/03/05/104372334.shtml [Accessed 2 March 2018].65Wenzhou Private Financing Regulation (2014) art.41.
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